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ABSTRACT 
Lauren Bauman: Activation Policies and Precarious Employment: How Labor and Social Policy 
Influence Women's Part-time Employment 
(Under the direction of John Stephens) 
 
Over the past few decades, advanced capitalist nations have seen increased numbers of 
individuals engaged in more precarious forms of employment, including part-time and temporary 
employment. During the same period, these same nations of continued to focus government 
spending on policies that are meant to encourage and support individuals reentering the labor 
force, active social and labor market policies. In light of these trends, this article explores the 
relationship between active policies and part-time employment for one important group of labor 
market entrants: women. Using data across 21 countries, I find that different forms of activation 
policies have different impacts on women’s employment trends. My results show that activate 
labor market policy spending by governments can be more effective at matching women to full-
time employment, while active social policies have mixed results.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Employment trends of advanced capitalist nations have been marked by increasing 
separation between those who consistently work within the formal labor market - “insiders” - and 
those who are at greater risk of being either outside the formal market labor (unemployed) or 
taking less secure (precarious) employment - “outsiders” - including part-time and temporary 
employment. This trend of labor market dualization has gained much recent academic attention, 
highlighting how institutional structures (Jaehrling & Méhaut 2012, Thelen 2014), politics 
(Rueda 2005), and policies (Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier & Seeleib-Kaiser 2012, Rueda 
2014) have provided greater security to “insiders” and provided less employment certainty for 
“outsiders”. Additionally, scholars have pointed to particular groups that are more likely than 
others to be placed in precarious employment positions, and therefore are disproportionately hurt 
by market dualization (Fervers & Schwander 2015, Schwander & Häusermann 2013, Schwander 
2019). 
Unlike previous periods in history, there has been a renewed energy by most advanced 
capitalist nations to encourage labor market integration of its citizens (Bonoli 2010). These 
“activation” policies, those whose purpose are to help individuals enter the labor force, have 
been studied for their influence on income/poverty outcomes, as well as overall levels of labor 
market integration (Caliendo & Schmidl 2016, Rovny 2014, Van Vliet & Wang 2015). What is 
less studied, though, is the relationship between these policy tools and market dualization. In this 
article, I will fill the gap in this research agenda to explore how popular activation policies 
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influence precarious employment. In particular, this article will address how active social and 
labor market policies influence levels of part-time employment and unemployment across post-
industrial, OECD countries. I argue that while many of these policy interventions may be 
effective at increasing overall employment rates for outsiders, these activation policies have 
different effects depending on whether the employment outcome is precarious (part-time) or not. 
I theorize that while activation policies may be helpful in gaining access to the labor market, they 
do not necessarily change the reasons why particular groups of outsiders take on precarious jobs. 
Thus, it is necessary to look at the specific impact of policy measures on different employment 
statuses. 
In this study I look at one specific group of labor market outsiders: women. Due to 
women’s relative distance from the labor market and increased needs for employment flexibility 
due to pregnancy, childrearing, and domestic labor, women are seen to be at a higher risk of 
being a labor market outsider (Schwander & Häusermann 2013). With the increasing 
government attention and spending on activation policies aimed at women (daycare and 
maternity/parental leave), women are a particularly important group of outsides to study in 
relation to activation policies. 
To test the relationship between different activation policies and employment outcomes, I 
perform an analysis on overall labor market outcomes and levels of women employed in part-
time jobs. The analysis covers 21 advanced capitalist nations and covers years from 1980 to 
2010. In my analysis I find that while all forms of activation policies influence overall 
employment rates for women, activation policies have different impacts depending on if the 
employment outcome of interest is full-time, part-time, or involuntary part-time employment. 
The results suggest that ALMP funding is the most productive type of activation policy in not 
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only encouraging overall employment, but even more importantly in preventing involuntary part-
time employment. In contrast, generosity in daycare spending is an effective policy for 
encouraging some forms of employment (including full-time employment) but not as effective of 
a tool in preventing involuntary part-time employment. Finally, generosity in parental leave is 
not as effective in supporting full-time employment but does work to support voluntary part-time 
employment (and discourage involuntary part-time employment). 
This paper starts to explore the shape and nature of employment outcomes and its 
relationship to activation policies. This is a particularly important issue considering the 
increasing dualization of markets for insiders and outsiders in advanced capitalist nations. 
Continued cycles of unemployment and precarious employment can have detrimental effects on 
individuals, and thus it is critical to understand how public policy is working to alleviate or 
worsen precarious employment outcomes for its citizens
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CHAPTER 2: INSIDER/OUTSIDER THEORY 
Insider/outsider theory of employment and unemployed was originally developed in order 
to explain the puzzle of persistent unemployment in the 1980s in advanced capitalist nations. To 
explain the continued levels of high unemployment, Lindbeck and Snower (1988) looked at the 
behavior of labor market insiders, or those with gainful employment, in relation to wage 
bargaining structures. In brief, the theory describes the relative position of power for labor 
market insiders due to (1) their relatively high level of representation in collective bargaining - 
typically performed by unions, who are argued to be more likely to represent current members - 
and (2) the relatively high costs of replacing employees, particularly in the context of increasing 
employment protections. Labor market outsiders, which Lindbeck and Snower define as those 
who are unemployed, lack collective bargaining representation and are less likely to be offered 
jobs due to the relatively high costs of replacing current employees. 
Scholars later broadened this concept to encompass the new forms of employment 
insecurities that define advanced capitalist nations today and that tend to produce enduring 
temporary and part-time employment (Emmenegger et al. 2012, Schwander & Häusermann 
2013). The more encompassing view of outsiders - to include precarious or atypical employment 
- is reflective of the labor market patterns of post-industrial economies, in which larger portions 
of the working-aged population are engaged in part-time and temporary employment (OECD 
2015). This has been the focus of a growing literature on market dualization, which describes the 
trend of two different systems for workers: one of greater privilege, protection, and security for
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 insiders and another for those precariously employed (Emmenegger et al. 2012, Palier & 
Thelen 2010, Rueda 2005). 
Additionally, scholars have begun to look specifically at groups of people who are more 
at risk of being an outsider. In particular, scholars have focused on women, low-skilled workers, 
youth, and (more recently) migrants as groups with a higher likelihood of being unemployed and 
taking atypical jobs (Fervers & Schwander 2015, Schwander & Häusermann 2013, Schwander 
2019, Römer 2017). In this paper I will focus on one of these groups: women. I have chosen to 
focus on women because many activation policies have been created to directly address the new 
social risks related to women, such as childcare and maternity/parental leave policies. Women 
have also been increasingly engaged in the labor market over the past several decades. As such, 
women are a particularly important group to study in relation to activation policies. 
Why are women considered outsiders? Due to family structures and expectations - 
including the expectation of women being the main caretaker in many societies - women are 
more likely to move in and out of employment and have to take on part-time employment 
throughout their working-age years (Biegert 2014, Schwander & Häusermann 2013). 
Furthermore, with the expectation that women will not be the primary breadwinner, they are 
more likely to either be unemployed or take on atypical jobs (Esping-Andersen 1999).
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CHAPTER 3: ACTIVATION POLICIES 
With the understanding that some groups of individuals are at a higher risk of precarious 
employment, how do different social and labor policies impact their access to gainful 
employment? In this section, I will discuss the different policy tools that are implemented to 
encourage labor market entrance: activation policies. Since the range of social and labor policies 
used by governments is quite large, I will only discuss the policies that are aimed specifically at 
the subgroup of outsiders that are the focus of my study (women) and the policies that are widely 
discussed in the social policy and welfare state literature as being important to employment 
outcomes. Finally, I will outline my main expectations for different types of labor and social 
policies and their impact on labor market outcomes. 
Active Labor Market Policies 
ALMPs became popular policies to help promote the reincorporate of those outside of the 
labor market in advanced capitalist nations (Bonoli 2010). ALMPs come in a variety of different 
forms, including job training programs, career search services, and direct job creation in the 
public or non-profit spheres. What connects these different forms of ALMPs is that they aim to 
get citizens working again. The expectation that ALMPs will be helpful for labor market 
outsiders stems not only from the fact that these policies are aimed specifically at outsiders (or at 
least at a specific type of outsider, primarily the unemployed). Scholars have also argued that 
ALMPs, in their different constellations, work to remove some barriers of labor-market 
participation, provide training to make outsiders better candidates for jobs and increasing the
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 incentives of employment, which are often seen in the form of reducing unemployment 
benefits (Bonoli 2010, Gangl 2003, Morel, Palier & Palme 2012). 
Since women historically have been more likely to be outside the labor market 
(unemployed) as well as more likely to take on part-time jobs, ALMPs are well suited to 
encourage women’s employment. Other studies have shown in the post-industrial context 
(primarily in Europe) that ALMPs can help women gain access to the labor market and find jobs 
(Bergemann & Van den Berg 2008). This is particularly true for training programs in con- texts 
were there are relatively lower levels of women’s employment (Biewen, Fitzenberger, 
Osikominu & Waller 2006, Cavaco, Fouère & Pouget 2005), since they provide an opportunity 
for women to increase their skills, and thus gain access to more and better-quality jobs. 
While the ALMP policies’ intent may be to get those excluded from the labor market 
back in employment, some recent work by Bonoli and Liechti (2018) argues that ALMPs are not 
always the most effective policies in supporting those most excluded from the labor market. 
Furthermore, ALMPs are not equally effective on all types of outsiders. One criticism of ALMPs 
- and social investment approaches, more broadly - is that such policies, despite their good 
intentions, fail to reach the most disadvantaged segments of the working-age population 
(Cantillon 2011, Bonoli & Liechti 2018). Bonoli and Liechti (2018) argue that due to the fact 
that ALMPs often require certain entry costs, including requiring particular cognitive and non-
cognitive skills (for example, language skills), ALMPs may exclude the most disadvantaged 
labor market outsiders. Furthermore, they argue that due to limited available spots in many 
ALMPs, caseworkers may prioritize those individuals they believe are closest to the labor market 
(and therefore more likely to gain employment). Societal expectations or stigmas as well may 
work against particular groups of outsiders, leading caseworkers to overlook certain applicants. 
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Bonoli and Liechti’s argument is well suited to explain why some outsiders may not 
benefit from ALMPs, including those who are migrants and potentially those who are low-skilled 
workers. One could apply their logic to women as well. Women, who often are expected to do 
more (unpaid) domestic labor and childrearing may not have the time available to engage in 
ALMP programs, such as additional training programs. While I agree with Bonoli and Liechti 
that ALMPs may not be able to reach the particular groups of women who are most at need, on 
average I would expect that ALMPs are still beneficial to women looking to gain access to the 
labor force. As such, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1a: Increased public spending on ALMPs will positively relate an increase in the overall level 
of women’s employment. 
Shifting my outcome of interest to full-time versus part-time employment, my 
expectations (in part) and my reasoning for my expectations change. Although ALMPs attempt 
to reintegrate outsiders back into the labor force, they do not fundamentally change the 
characteristics that make women outsiders. Despite further training or temporary job placements, 
women still are more likely to move in and out of the labor force. For example, women still bear 
the majority of the household and childcare work in high-income countries (Fuwa 2004), 
meaning they will have less time and opportunity to take on full-time jobs. Instead, women may 
take on part-time or temporary employment or potentially choose to exit the labor market 
entirely. Thus, I expect that ALMPs will increase the percentage of women employed in part-
time jobs. 
H1b: Increased public spending on ALMP will positively relate to an increase in the level of 
women employed in part-time jobs. 
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While part-time status may indicate an overall lower quality of a job, since they are often 
associated with lower wages and lesser benefits, not all part-time jobs are made the same. Some 
women when given the opportunity to work full-time may still prefer working less than 30 hours 
a week. To best capture the precarious nature of part-time employment, it is useful to discuss 
voluntary versus involuntary employment. Those who are employed in involuntary part-time 
employment wish to be working more hours and be in a full-time job. These jobs are not 
satisfactory to those employed in them, thus indicating that the job is undesirable and potentially 
of a lower quality. 
For women in these involuntary part-time jobs, what effect can we expect from ALMPs? 
ALMPs still do not work to change the underlying structural conditions that make women 
outsiders, following the logic described above. ALMPs, though, do have the ability to change 
how hirable a woman is, for example, by providing them with new skills or creating full-time 
jobs in the public sector. While ALMPs do not inherently provide a more flexible work 
environment for women and mothers, ALMPs can provide women with skills that make them 
more hirable and by extension new jobs that are better and more flexible may open up. With 
these dual pressures, I expect that ALMPs will not have a significant effect on the level of 
women in involuntary part-time jobs. 
H1c: Increased public spending on ALMP will negatively, but insignificantly, relate to an 
increase in the level of women employed in involuntary part-time jobs. 
Active Social Policies 
Active social policies are a more recent feature of modern welfare states. Such policies, 
similarly to ALMPs, help facilitate labor market entrance of individuals. In particular, these 
policies have been created to help facilitate the entrance of women into the labor force. 
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The provision of childcare lessens the amount of labor at home for parents, especially women. 
This can be particularly helpful when the provision is subsidized or freely provided via 
governments. With the provision of childcare, women can shift the time and energy once 
utilizing for childrearing towards re-entering the labor force. Therefore, I would expect increases 
in public spending in childcare to have a positive effect on women’s employment rates. 
In addition to childcare policies, parental leave policies may help facilitate women’s 
labor force re-entry. Instead of being forced to choose between staying employed or having a 
child, a woman can have a job and family with the implementation of maternity/parental leave 
programs. Similarly to childcare policies, I expect that greater generosity in parental leave would 
be correlated with higher levels of female employment. 
H2a: Greater generosity in public provision of childcare and parental leave policies will 
positively and significantly relate to an increase in the overall level of women’s employment. 
How could these active social policies influence women’s part-time employment rates? 
Childcare policies may help alleviate some of the pressures that force women to take on part- 
time versus full-time jobs. The provision of childcare could provide greater time to work, and 
therefore a woman may take on a full-time job. There are, though, still expectations that women 
should put in more time taking care of children and the home, so childcare policies may provide 
women with more time to work, but that work may be put into (unpaid) domestic labor, rather 
than a full-time paid job. Following this logic, I expect that greater public spending on childcare 
will increase the rate of employed women working full-time and part-time jobs. 
My expectations for the influence of parental leave policies on rates of employed women 
in part-time jobs differs from that of childcare policies. Parental leave is still (typically) offered 
to part-time employees, but these policies do not properly address the reasons many women take 
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on part-time employment. Rather, parental leave works to provide some specified amount of 
time off for new mothers, but does not work to lighten the load in terms of childrearing (unlike 
spending on childcare) or domestic labor. As such, I expect that parental leave policies will not 
significantly influence part-time or full-time employment rates of women. 
H2b: Greater generosity in public provision of childcare will positively and significantly 
influence the level of women employed in part-time jobs, while greater generosity in parental 
leave will not significantly influence level of women employed in part-time jobs. 
A similar logic can be used when considering the relationship between involuntary part-
time employment and these active social policies. The public provision of childcare should 
provide some relief to mothers who can then put that new energy into finding full-time 
employment or increasing their hours of work per week. As such, women should not be forced 
into jobs with lesser hours. Thus, I expect that greater spending in daycare should decrease the 
number of women in involuntary part-time employment. 
For parental leave policies, these do not function to shift the work burden for women, nor 
provide them with the opportunity for better jobs, thus I do not expect that parental leave policies 
will decrease the number of women in involuntary part-time employment. 
H2c: Greater generosity in public provision of childcare will negatively and significantly 
influence the level of women employed in involuntary part-time jobs, while greater generosity in 
parental leave will not significantly influence level of women employed in involuntary part- time 
jobs.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS 
The analysis focuses on understanding the employment outcomes for women in relation 
to labor, social, and welfare policies. The analysis includes 21 advanced capitalist nations and 
covers years from 1980-2010.1 
Outcome Variables 
The outcome variables for this paper are different labor market outcomes for the one 
group of the labor market outsiders discussed above: women. All employment outcome variables 
are taken from the OECD database. I use a few different labor market outcomes: percentage of 
employed working-age women (all forms of employment), percentage of working-age women in 
full-time and part-time employment, and finally the percentage of working-age women in 
voluntary and involuntary part-time employment. Separating the labor market outcomes allow us 
to better see how the dynamics of market dualization have impacted these labor market outsiders. 
One needs to proceed with caution when interpreting results for full-time versus part-time 
employment, for this data does not provide direct answers to who is entering or exiting the labor 
market or what the reasons are for choosing full-time versus part-time employment. I am thus 
careful in my discussion of the results in the next section. I do believe that the voluntary versus 
involuntary employment variables help to better capture whether one is forced into precarious
 
1 The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
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 employment versus desiring the part-time status, thus providing a beneficial window into 
activation policies’ influence on precarious employment outcomes. 
Explanatory Variables: Activation Policies 
The explanatory variables were pulled primarily from The Comparative Welfare State 
Database (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2020). My first set of variables deal with activation policies. 
To capture the relationship between ALMP and employment outcomes, I have included a 
measure of total ALMP spending as a percentage of GDP. In order to account for countercyclical 
ALMP spending, spending that is specifically in response to economic downturn and low 
employment levels, I divide the ALMP expenditure variable by the unemployment rate. Thus, 
the ALMP variable captures the governments’ proactive spending patterns to encourage 
individuals to join the labor market. 
I have also included a measure of public expenditure on daycare and parental leave 
benefits. The daycare variable represents the total public expenditure on daycare/home- help 
service provision, as a percentage of GDP and it comes from Comparative Welfare State 
Database. The parental leave data comes from Gauthier’s Family Policy Dataset. The parental 
leave variable includes both length of leave provided as well as the replacement rate provided 
during leave. It is important to capture both of these elements, since both feed into overall 
generosity. Furthermore, I cap the length of leave to a year in order to discern between long-
term, low-replacement rate parental leave benefits and short-term, high-replacement rate parental 
leave benefits. It is important to make such a distinction since research suggestions that extended 
leave beyond a year with low replacement rates can actually encourage women to exit the labor 
market (often seen in continental welfare states) (Morgan & Zippel 2003, Mandel & Semyonov 
2005). 
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Control Variables: Employment Protection Policies 
While the main explanatory variables I am interested in are activation policies, there are 
several other policies that have been identified as important to understanding insider-outsider 
dynamics and precarious labor market outcomes. The first additional control variable I consider 
is employment protection policies (EPLs). Broadly, EPL covers any measure that aims at 
strengthening the protections of employed individuals, determining how difficult it is hire or fire 
any employee. Since these policies are meant to help increase the security of one’s employment, 
it disincentivizes an employer from seeking new talent (Biegert 2017). As such, EPLs have 
typically been construed as beneficial to labor market insiders, increasing job security and 
stability (Barbieri 2009, Gangl 2003). What this means for outsiders is that there will be fewer 
opportunities to apply for full-time, permanent jobs because employers will be more restricted in 
when and how they can dismiss current employees. Furthermore, such policies may shift 
employer preferences towards part-time and temporary employment, since they are less 
restrictive/regulated for employers (Palier & Thelen 2010). Therefore, EPL works to both 
restrengthen the current position of insiders and creates more atypical employment options for 
outsiders. As predicted in the dualization literature, as employment protections become stricter, 
market dualization will increase (Biegert 2017). 
To account for the role of EPLs, I use an indicator of employment protection legislation 
strength that comes from the OECD. The variable is an index of overall strictness of employment 
protection legislation, coded from zero to six, with zero being the least strict legislation and six 
being the strictest. 
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Control Variables: Passive Policies 
While activation policies help to address some new forms of social risk and employment 
status, passive policies still remain important to understanding labor market patterns. Policies 
that constitute passive labor market policies are those that aim to provide income protection for 
those outside the labor market, easing any temporary transition out of the labor market. Included 
under the umbrella of passive labor market policies are unemployment benefits. These policies, 
while providing some security if job loss were to occur, do not work to help individuals gain 
access to the labor market. As such, these policies do not work to directly benefit outsiders, and 
rather, are tools to help provide some income security to labor market insiders (Bradley & 
Stephens 2007). Thus, passive labor market policies will have a negative effect on the 
employment of women. To capture unemployment benefits I include a measure for overall 
generosity of unemployment benefits. 
Control Variables: Unions, Taxation, and GDP 
The final important set of potential factors influencing employment rates of outsiders are 
related to union organizing and taxation.  
One important factor in the literature on employment outcomes is that of union 
representation. Stronger unions are associated with strengthening the position of labor market 
insiders, and therefore could have negative effects on the position of outsiders. To capture the 
effects of unions on women, I include the variable of union density. 
Next, social security and payroll taxes influence employment rates by increasing costs for 
an employer. High social security taxes will inhibit an employer’s ability to hire, thus higher 
social security taxes and payroll taxes would negatively influence the overall rate of women’s 
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employment. My measure for social security (SS) and payroll (PR) taxes are presented as the 
taxes combined as a percentage of GDP. 
Finally, I include in my models the variable GDP per capital to account for employment 
trends that are caused by the country’s economic condition, rather than policy choices. 
For a full list of variables with definitions and sources, please see the Appendix. 
Model 
For my analysis, I use a linear model with country-level fixed effects. Fixed-effects 
models have the benefit of accounting for unobserved country-level variation, such as 
unexplained cultural differences. It is particularly important for the analysis to capture any 
unobserved country differences that may be influencing women’s employment outcomes since 
the main concern of this paper is to see how particular types of policies relate to women’s 
employment outcomes, not how particular societal factors specific to a country may influence a 
woman’s desire to enter the workforce or not. I use the plm function in R which provides robust 
standard errors.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS: FEMALE EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES 
Table 1 summarizes the models for female employment outcomes. Model one has as its 
outcome variable the total percentage of working-aged women. This model provides a base for 
comparison for the other models that show the dynamics between activation policies and 
employment outcomes. The model shows the predicted relationships between activation policies 
and women’s employment with ALMP spending, daycare spending, and parental leave policies 
all having a positive relationship with women’s employment. 
Models two and three begin to show some nuances in the usefulness of activation policies 
and different forms of employment. Model two uses the full-time (30 or more hours a week) 
employment rate of working-aged women as its outcome variable and model three uses the part-
time (less then 30 hours a week) employment rate of working-aged women as its outcome 
variable. The positive and significant relationship of ALMP and daycare spending is carried over 
to full-time employment. This result could mean that ALMP spending, when it is used 
proactively by governments, and public spending on daycare encourages women to not only 
enter the workforce, but engage in full-time jobs. This follows along with the theoretical 
expectation for daycare spending, for the public provision of daycare should lessen the burden of 
mothers to provide care at home, thus leaving more time for gainful employment. 
The part-time employment model shows that there is a positive and significant relation- 
ship between ALMP spending and part-time employment, but no significant relationship 
between daycare spending or parental leave, partially meeting my expectations. It is difficult to
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 interpret the relationship between ALMP and part-time employment. Those who are 
proponents of ALMP spending could argue that this relationship shows that women who 
otherwise would have been unemployed are now able to find part-time employment that fulfills 
their career aspirations. Others, though, who are more skeptical of the potential benefits of 
ALMP spending may argue that the ALMP programs are not matching women to the full-time, 
secure, and well-benefited jobs that women desire, and rather match them to more precarious, 
part-time employment that perpetuates their outsider status. The positive relationship in Model 2 
provides some encouraging signs that ALMP can support women’s full-time employment, but 
does not provide full clarity. Rather, the models in Table 2 work to provide more light on this 
issue, which will be discussed further below. 
The insignificant relationship between parental leave generosity with part-time 
employment is not surprising, and follows my expectation in hypothesis 2b. Parental leave, while 
it provides greater flexibility in jobs during and immediately after pregnancy, does not change 
the core structural reasons why women are labor market outsiders. In contrast, my expectation 
was not met in relationship to daycare spending. I would expect that the lack of a statistically 
significant relationship between daycare spending and part-time employment is due to the fact 
that those who work part-time would still have a great deal of flexibility in their schedule, and 
thus would be less likely to depend on the public provision of daycare. Also, not all women in 
the dataset are mothers. It is possible that mothers could be underrepresented in the sample, or 
that a larger sample size could better pick up the relationship between daycare spending and part-
time employment. 
For the non-activation policy variables, the results for EPLs are interesting. Model 3 
shows that the stricter the EPL the lower the rate of women working in part-time jobs. This result 
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could be interpreted as stricter EPLs make insiders more protected and thus outsiders (women) 
are limited in their job options, including part-time employment, which fits the general 
predictions within the literature. Across all three models more generous unemployment benefits 
significantly increased the percentage of women working, demonstrating the importance of 
unemployment benefits in encouraging high rates of employment. These results on 
unemployment benefits go against the neoliberal assumption that generous unemployment 
benefits discourage unemployed individuals from re-entering the labor force. The results for 
union density provide some evidence that unions are not concerned with advocating for outsiders 
(part-time employees), as suggested by Rueda (2005). Finally, social security and payroll taxes 
interestingly are beneficial in terms of increasing levels of full-time employment but decreasing 
part-time employment, which may indicate an insider preference of social security and payroll 
taxes. 
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As noted above, the models in Table 1 do not provide a clear image of the desirability of 
the part-time jobs. Some women may simply have a preference for a part-time job. Similarly, not 
all part-time jobs are inherently of a poor quality - some may come with generous benefits and 
higher salaries, along with greater flexibility (which may be desirable for some women). While 
the OECD data cannot fully capture the quality of the part-time jobs, there is data that captures 
the desirability of part-time employment: voluntary versus involuntary part-time employment. 
Those who are working in involuntary part-time employment wish to be in a full-time job or 
working more hours. Thus, the variable helps to capture whether these activation policies help to 
match women to desirable jobs. 
Table 2 provides the results for models run with voluntary (Model 1) and involuntary 
(Model 2) part-time employment as their outcome variables. I will discuss the results by the 
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outcome variable. ALMP spending has a negative and significant relationship with involuntary 
part-time employment, which suggests that ALMP spending, rather than encouraging women to 
take precarious jobs they do not want or work less than they wish, works to help women find 
gainful employment. In contrast, ALMP spending and voluntary part-time employment does not 
have a significant relationship, but the sign remains negative. What these two models signal is 
the ALMP spending does not inherently encourage part-time employment and can discourage 
unwanted part-time employment. There is a possibility, still, that the ALMP spending could be 
encouraging women to stop looking for employment all together and thus completely exiting the 
labor market, for example, because their partner has gainful employment (a single-earner 
household). While such an interpretation is possible, it makes greater theoretical sense that 
ALMP spending encourages full-time employment (as Table 1 Model 2 indicates) and 
discourages involuntary part-time employment. Thus, I suggest that the evidence here supports 
that ALMP spending does work to productively encourage desirable, full-time employment for 
women. Of my theorized dual pressures discussed above, it appears that ALMP’s benefits of 
becoming more hirable outweigh women’s time pressures, contributing to the unexpected 
significance of ALMPs on involuntary part-time employment.  
In terms of daycare spending, the results indicate that increased public spending on 
daycare results in less voluntary part-time employment, and has no significant impact on part-
time involuntary employment. These results have a few potential interpretations. The first, which 
would suggest that daycare spending is a helpful policy measure for women’s employment, is 
that daycare spending encourages women’s full-time employment by providing them more time 
for work, and thus the negative relationship between daycare spending and voluntary part-time 
employment is indicative of women moving out of part-time employment and into full-time 
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employment. The second interpretation is that while daycare may be encouraging of full-time 
employment for some, it does not help all women who wish to work (whether full-time or part-
time). A third potential interpretation, focusing on the involuntary part-time results, is that 
daycare spending does not significantly help those who are in undesirable and precarious part-
time jobs. Thus, potentially, childcare does not help those who desire full-time employment most 
and instead helps those who are relatively indifferent to being employed full-time in the labor 
market. 
The results for parental leave on voluntary and involuntary part-time employment suggest 
that more generous parental leave policies can help support women to find desirable jobs. These 
desirable jobs may be in the form of part-time or full-time jobs. Thus, generous parental leave 
may be a useful policy tool for encouraging women’s participation in the labor force by allowing 
greater flexibility and ease in temporarily exiting the labor force when pregnant or with a 
newborn baby. 
Of the control variables, the most interesting results is that unemployment benefit 
generosity is positively related with both forms of part-time employment. These results provide 
even more evidence that generous employment benefits help to encourage women to find a job, 
and potentially any job (as the involuntary part-time employment results suggest), even if that 
job is not as many hours as the individual wants. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
As labor market conditions change and new social risks emerge in advanced capitalist 
nations, it is important to understand how labor and social policies encourage or discourage labor 
market participation. In this paper, I have focused on the relationship between activation policies 
- both active social policies (in relation to women’s employment) and active labor market 
policies - and the employment outcomes of one group of labor market outsiders: women. By 
investigating the reasons for women’s exclusion from the labor market, I could better understand 
how outsider status relates to policy initiatives. To capture how these activation policies may 
influence different labor market outcomes, I looked at both secure (full-time) and precarious 
(part-time and involuntary part-time) forms of employment. 
The analyses indicate that different types of activation policies have different effects 
depending on the type of employment outcome explored. ALMPs appear to be effective at 
encouraging the incorporation of outsiders into desirable jobs. ALMPs not only have a positive 
relationship with full-time employment, but they also have a negative and significant relationship 
to involuntary part-time employment. This indicates that ALMPs not simply place women into 
just any job, but rather they can help match women to jobs with the hours and full-time status 
that they prefer. In contrast to ALMPs, the results suggest that public spending on daycare, while 
helpful in providing mothers with the additional time to engage in full-time jobs, is not effective 
in discouraging involuntary part-time employment. Thus, the public provision of daycare is 
helpful to some mothers and families, but may not alone be sufficient in reducing childrearing 
and domestic work strains that other mothers face. Mixed results were also observed with
 25 
 parental leave policies. Parental leave policies, while having a negligible effect on full-
time employment, were positively related to voluntary part- time employment of women and 
negatively related to involuntary part-time employment of women. This, unlike ALMP spending, 
would suggest that parental leaves’ benefits only go as far as enabling women who wish to have 
some employment but not full-time employment. All together, these results clearly show that 
despite all these policies having significant positive effects on women’s overall employment 
rates, these policies do not work in the same way when looking at different employment 
outcomes. 
This project is only a first step in looking at how different labor policies can influence 
different employment outcomes. The core argument of this paper is that scholars need to pay 
more attention to the different impacts of labor and social policy based on outsider status. If 
labor and social policies do not keep in mind the barriers that restrict outsiders, outsiders will 
remain at the peripheries of the labor market. Future studies should consider different groups of 
outsiders, such as low-skilled workers, youth, and migrants. Additional, further research should 





Variable Definition Source 
Female employment 
(total) 
Percentage of working-age (15-65) 
women in the labor force 




Percentage of working-age (15-65) 
women in full-time jobs (30+ hours a 
week) 




Percentage of working-age (15-65) 
women in part-time jobs (less than 30 
hours a week) 




Percentage of working-age (15-65) 
women in voluntary part-time jobs 




Percentage of working-age (15-65) 
women in involuntary part-time jobs 
(wishes to be working 30+ hours a 
week) 
OECD Labor Market 
Statistics 
ALMP spending Public and mandatory private 
expenditure on active labor market 
programs, as a percentage of GDP, 
divided by the unemployment rate 
OECD Social Expenditure 
Statistics 
Daycare spending Public expenditure on daycare/ home-
help service provision, as a percentage 
of GDP 
OECD Social Expenditure 
Statistics* 
Parental leave benefits Average replacement rate in 
parental leave for the first year 
Gauthier (2011) 
EPL Employment protection legislation, an 
index of the overall strictness ranging 
from 0 (least strictness) to 6 (most 
strictness) 




Index of unemployment generosity 
where higher values indicate greater 
generosity 
Scruggs (2014)* 
Union Density Net union membership as a percentage 
of employed wage and salary earners. 
Visser (2011)* 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita, in 2011 USD Penn World Table* 
Social Security and 
Payroll taxes 
Social security taxes collected (made 
up of compulsory social contributions 
OECD Revenue Statistics* 
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paid by employers, employees, self-
employed, and unemployed to social 
insurance schemes) plus payroll taxes 
(paid by employers as a condition for 
employing workers), as a percentage of 
GDP 
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